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The purpose of this article is to identify the financial costs relative to the benefits of the 
“no-fly” list. Numerous scholars, security experts, lawyers, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), journalists, and bloggers have commented on the well-known 
flaws in the current terrorist watch list system. Lawyers have pointed out the many 
civil liberty issues associated with the list and its hindrance of due process.1 The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has repeatedly published the many flaws it 
sees in the way that the list is administrated.2 Bruce Schneier, a popular security 
columnist and blogger, documents the various reasons why the no-fly list serves no 
benefit at all, providing only “security theatre” rather than actual protection.3 Each of 
these analyses is useful and contributes to an understanding of whether or not the no-
fly list is, in aggregate, helpful in protecting citizens against terrorism, and at what 
social and civil liberty cost.  
What is missing, however, is an analysis of the no-fly list from a financial 
perspective. This article is interested in understanding the monetary costs of the 
program. As such, it seeks to answer some basic and fundamental questions that have 
not yet been answered (or asked): How much does the no-fly list cost to create and 
maintain? What are the costs of the consequences, both intended and unintended, of 
the list? How many resources, both governmental and private, are involved in the 
operation of the list? And, what are the benefits, both tangible (i.e. monetary) and 
intangible, that the list provides? This is an important set of questions because without 
understanding the monetary costs of a protection program relative to the benefits, it is 
difficult to assess whether or not the program is worth the costs. Further, without such 
an understanding it is impossible to intelligently decide how anti-terror money should 
be allocated. It is surprising that, given the importance of these questions, they have 
not been asked and addressed in a systematic fashion.  
Consequently this article represents a “first take” at addressing these questions by 
assessing the financial costs of the no-fly list program. It does not, however, seek to 
serve as a comprehensive answer to the question of “is the no-fly list worth the money 
we are putting into it?” The reason is that one cannot begin to conduct such an analysis 
without aggregating the costs and benefits first and then placing the no-fly list in 
context of the other anti-terror programs and their associated costs. The no-fly list 
might very well be worth the expense if it is the government’s only tool in preventing 
terrorist attacks. It might also be the case that the list is less valuable given redundancy 
in the “layered security” model of securing air travel. These are important questions 
and ones that can only be addressed after having identified the financial costs and 
benefits of the program. Thus this article should be viewed as the first step in what will 
hopefully become a systematic and comprehensive approach to understanding whether 
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or not the no-fly list provides added value in the context of the government’s anti-
terrorism campaign.  
As will be analyzed below, it is estimated that the costs of the no-fly list, since 2002, 
range from approximately $300 million (a conservative estimate) to $966 million (an 
estimate on the high end). Using those figures as low and high potentials, a reasonable 
estimate is that the U.S. government has spent over $500 million on the project since 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Using annual data, this article suggests that 
the list costs taxpayers somewhere between $50 million and $161 million a year, with a 
reasonable compromise of those figures at approximately $100 million. Clearly the no-
fly list is a program that is not without substantial cost. It represents, at least 
financially, a large part of the government’s protection of air travel.4 In order to begin 
to analyze whether or not the benefits are worth the costs, both must be identified and 
analyzed. It is that task to which the article will now turn. 
METHODOLOGY 
Source Material and Estimation Error 
One likely reason for why a financial cost/benefit approach has not been conducted, at 
least in an unclassified manner,5 is that it is difficult to do. The biggest reason for the 
difficulty is that the government does not publish the aggregated costs of programs 
such as the no-fly list. As will be illustrated below, the no-fly list is a product of 
numerous government agencies and private sector involvement and thus represents a 
rather diffuse network of resources working together for common cause. This ensures 
that a variety of perspectives and sufficient technical expertise are aggregated into the 
program, but it also means that the no-fly list is not one program represented by a 
single line-item in a budget request. Rather, it is made up of pieces of multiple 
programs spanning public and private spheres, many of which are classified and 
unknown to the public. 
The second reason why conducting a financial cost/benefit approach is difficult is 
that much of the information pertaining to the list is classified. Sources I spoke to 
between November 2007 and January 2008, who are close to the list, could only 
provide general feedback and guidance – anything remotely specific would fall under 
the classified domain. While this guidance was extremely useful, and constitutes one of 
my main methods of vetting the figures contained in this article, it meant that the data-
gathering phase was done without much insight or help from those close to the 
program. Conducting a cost/benefit analysis when the details of the program are 
intentionally hidden from taxpayer view is challenging. 
The approach taken in this article is to estimate the costs based on what is available 
and then have individuals close to the list, to the extent that they are able, validate that 
the estimates are reasonable (or, in some cases, too high or too low). As such, many of 
the estimates contained in this article are based on data culled from press reports, 
public interviews with government officials, Congressional testimony, and occasionally 
specific budget requests and reports. These estimates were then provided to 
individuals in the security field who proffered limited, but extremely helpful, feedback. 
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One of the valuable criticisms of such an approach is that it is subject to much 
subjectivity. That is, choosing one number to represent an estimated cost requires the 
analyst to pick among many possible variations of cost and use that number to 
represent an aggregate cost. In anticipating this criticism, costs are estimated across 
three tiers: low, medium, and high.6 This is common practice in cost-benefit analyses 
as well as actuarial assessments and estimations.7 The low tier represents a 
conservative estimate, the medium tier represents a reasonable estimation, and the 
high tier represents a possible estimation. It should be noted that the high tier is not 
simply an inflated cost that attempts to account for all possible permutations of cost. I 
have tried to keep even the highest tier within a reasonable range. In cases of a 
particularly high number of unknown variables, I have tried to err on the side of 
conservative estimation so as not to inflate the costs due to extreme estimation error. A 
consequence of this move is that if there is estimation error in this article, it is likely to 
be biased towards the more conservative tier.  
Choosing a Cost-Benefit Framework 
There are a number of cost-benefit frameworks available to social science scholars.8 
Many are derived from economics and focus on largely tangible (typically monetary) 
costs and benefits. The difficulty with choosing a framework for this article is that we 
are dealing with explicit financial costs but both tangible and intangible benefits.9 That 
is, we can estimate what the monetary costs of the system are, but in comparing them 
to the benefits we have both monetary benefits (such as the future realized value of 
preventing a plane crash) and intangible benefits (such as the ability to monitor 
potentially dangerous individuals). The two are alike in that they both benefit the U.S. 
government and citizenry, but unlike in that one can be measured in dollar terms and 
the other can not. Nevertheless, as Arrow and others argue, in such cases where cost 
and benefits are assessed in different terms (value in money vs. value in social policy), 
cost/benefit analyses can still be helpful, and indeed, should be mandatory if not 
binding.10  
The Office of Management and Budget, in realizing the importance and difficulty in 
assessing government policies, has published its own recommended framework for 
conducting cost/benefit analysis. It is useful for our purpose because it explicitly 
addresses this problem of tangible and intangible benefits:  
Both intangible and tangible benefits and costs should be recognized. The 
relevant cost concept is broader than private-sector production and compliance 
costs or government cash expenditures. Costs should reflect the opportunity 
cost of any resources used, measured by the return to those resources in their 
most productive application elsewhere.11 
 Thus, the OMB framework serves as the main methodological framework for this 
article as it explicitly addresses governmental policy, on the one hand, and intangible 
as well as tangible costs and benefits on the other. 
Defining Terms 
Finally, before conducting an analysis of the costs of the no-fly list program, it is 
important to define precisely what it is that is being investigated. The no-fly list is 
essentially a “watch list” that prevents watched individuals from flying on commercial 
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aircraft. The list itself dates back to the 1980s in a very limited fashion (on September 
11, 2001 only sixteen names were on the list).12 After the 9/11 attacks the number of the 
names on the list grew tremendously, with some reports suggesting that the list grew to 
755,000+.13 It is now believed that the list contains roughly 40,000 names after a 
sustained effort to reduce the list to “key” individuals by scrubbing it of duplicates, 
reasonably certain safe flyers (such as U.S. Senators), and the like.14 While the 
government does not publish how names are put on the list, the public record suggests 
that the names are compiled from classified evidence conducted by a variety of 
government agencies.15 While the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
maintains the list, various agencies (see below) have input into it.16 It is important to 
note also that in popular speech the “no-fly list” is often equated with the “selectee 
list.” The two should be disaggregated. The selectee list is the Secondary Security 
Screening Selection that randomly selects passengers for additional screening and 
inspection. These individuals are allowed to fly after they have been cleared through 
security. Individuals on the “no-fly list” are not allowed to fly until they are cleared 
from the list and this requires more than a simple x-ray and body search. This article is 
interested in the costs of the no-fly list in particular, but future work should include an 
analysis of the selectee list as well. 
The broad mechanics of the list have been made available for public consumption. 
The government sends an updated version of the list to airlines on a regular basis. It is 
the responsibility of the airlines to check passenger names against the list.17 It has been 
noted that TSA has long had plans to take on some of the responsibility of name-
checking (particularly of names that are too sensitive to be sent to the airlines), first 
through the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS II) program 
and now through a similar program entitled “Secure Flight.”18  Development of this 
system has been delayed and it is unknown when it will be operational. Finally, the 
government is also developing a program entitled “Registered Traveler,” a 
public/private partnership between TSA and the Registered Traveler Interoperability 
Consortium (RTIC), which allows those individuals who pose a minimum security risk 
to submit themselves to background checks and subsequently submit to an easier and 
more streamlined airport security checkpoint experience. Having outlined the key 
aspects of the no-fly list, the article will now turn to estimating the costs of creating, 
maintaining, and dealing with the consequences of the list itself. 
ESTIMATING NO-FLY LIST COSTS19 
Establishing a Federal Government Resource Burn Rate 
A burn rate, or the cost of a given policy/program in terms of (1) the number of 
individuals involved, (2) their billing rate, and (3) the number of hours devoted to the 
project, is a useful way of estimating costs over time. Government agencies require 
potential contracting firms to provide an estimated burn rate in their response to 
proposals,20 and the OMB notes in their literature on conducting cost-benefit analyses 
the importance of identifying incremental costs over time.21 Calculating a burn rate for 
the no-fly list relies on estimating the number of individuals involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the list, those responsible for dealing with the consequences and 
ancillary effects of the list, and their respective billing rates. These individuals are 
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drawn from both the government and private sectors and constitute no-fly list 
resources. 
Estimating the number of individuals associated with the list is difficult because 
there is no one central agency or contracting firm responsible for its implementation. 
Sources in the security community and government documents from the U.S. GAO 
note that there are individuals drawn from over ten government agencies and multiple 
private firms.22 The non-exhaustive list includes: the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), National Security 
Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and various private government contracting firms such as 
Acxiom Corporation.23  
Given the broad scope of involvement and complexity of integrating the efforts 
among the various entities listed above, security professionals estimate that it is likely 
the number of individuals working on the list on a full-time basis is at least 250, with 
another 500 involved in some capacity on a partial-time basis. This represents the 
conservative or low estimate. Individuals I spoke with at various government 
contracting firms note that mid-range figures are likely in the 500 full/1000 partial 
range, with some estimating that the numbers could exceed 1000 full/1500 partial.  
Having estimated the number of individuals involved with the list, the next step is 
calculating their billing rate and amount of time devoted to the project. Turning to 
rates first, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provides a yearly salary 
scale ranging from approximately $17,000 to $124,000.24 A conservative figure that 
estimates the cost of government employee benefits is approximately 50 percent (Cox 
& Brunelli, 1994).25 That is, if the salary of a federal employee is $50k/year, the 
adjusted cost to taxpayers, inclusive of benefits, is approximately $75k/year. Sources 
in the security community note that among federal employees working on the no-fly 
list, there are very few at the lower ends of the pay scale, with most falling somewhere 
in the top third. On the private side, government contracting firms typically bill out 
their resources somewhere in the $100k-$500k/year range. This number varies 
depending on the expertise of the contractor, the profit margin of the firm, the type of 
work being conducted, etc. For the purposes of this article, it is worth using a 
conservative blended billing rate precisely because there are a large number of factors 
that lead to billing rate fluctuation. A conservative figure of $100k/year, inclusive of 
both government employees with benefits and private firm contractors, is a reasonable 
estimate, but is potentially much higher and not likely to be much lower. 
Finally, not all employees mentioned above spend their full-time working on the no-
fly list. The nature of the list suggests that there are likely a large number of individuals 
who do spend most of their time devoted to it, either in creating technology programs 
to support it, dealing with name removal requests, etc. There are a larger number of 
individuals, however, who work on the list part-time as needs arise. The FBI, TSA, and 
DHS, for instance, often collaborate on suspected individuals in order to determine 
whether or not they should be placed on the list. This type of activity does not consume 
an employee’s entire day, but does require time and effort. Consequently, part-time 
no-fly list employees can spend varied amounts of their day working on various list 
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activities. In order to estimate this amount of work, gradations of time spent on the list 
will increase as estimates of low/medium/high increase. At the conservative end, it is 
estimated that partial-time employees spend 25 percent of their time working on the 
no-fly list; the medium range figure is 50 percent and the high range figure 75 percent. 
This estimate allows considerable variation in the amount of time required of 
resources and seems reasonable among the security professionals that have reviewed 
the numbers.  
Having identified the major components of the burn rate and estimated their value, 
a simple calculation yields burn rate figures for the low, medium, and high estimates. 
At the conservative end, the burn rate is estimated to be $7.5 million per year. The 
middle-range figure is estimated to be $20 million per year and the upper-range figure 
at least $43 million a year.26 Importantly, these figures only represent the personnel 
burn rate.27 They do not include other costs, such as technology systems, costs to non-
government employees or costs to the private sector. It is to those costs that we now 
turn.    
Technology Product Costs 
The no-fly list operates both as a database of names and a system for ensuring that 
those named individuals do not board airplanes. The first component, the database, is 
maintained by DHS and TSA. The second component, the method of cross-checking 
passengers with the database, is maintained by the individual airlines.28 The 
government supplies the watch list to the air carrier whose automated information 
technology (IT) systems screen passengers. According to the GAO, 99 percent of all 
passengers on domestic flights are screened through the use of these computer 
systems; the other remaining 1 percent of passengers are “manually screened” because 
the airlines do not have an automated system.29 Finally, for international flights, air 
carriers are required to provide a list of passengers to Customs and Border Protection 
before take-off.30  
These two components can be disaggregated and their costs estimated individually. 
On the government side, the Associated Press in 2006 reported that the TSA had spent 
more than $200 million on three aspects of the no-fly list: Transportation Worker 
Identity Credential (a program for allowing “safe” individuals access to secure port 
areas), Secure Flight, and the Registered Traveler Program (a program that allows 
individuals to submit themselves to background checks in order to receive less 
thorough screenings at airports).31 Once Secure Flight was suspended, in February 
2006, Leslie Miller of the Associated Press reported that the total cost of the program 
was $200 million.32 Estimating the cost of the government side of the equation then is 
relatively straightforward. The $200 million in investment of Secure Flight since 2002 
presumably includes human resources as well as the technology product, so the cost 
must be discounted slightly. A conservative estimate of the government’s technology 
costs for this program is $150 million. A mid-range estimate is $200 million, the 
quoted cost according to the Associated Press. Finally, an upper-range figure is $250 
million which would include any updates and new developments since the AP’s story 
broke in early 2006. 
The airline technology products used to cross-check passenger names with the 
government-supplied no-fly list is more difficult to estimate because the air carriers 
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have not published their compliance costs.  Steven Lott of Aviation Daily, a trade 
journal for the airline industry, notes that as of July 2006 there was no uniform way 
for airlines to transmit their passenger lists to CBP, which accounts for the numerous 
in-air diversions and delays (to be discussed below) caused by airlines transmitting 
passenger lists after takeoff.33 In order to correct this problem, DHS has asked the 
airlines to adopt one of two systems. The first would have airlines transmit passenger 
information individually when each passenger checks into the flight, up to fifteen 
minutes before departure. Lott estimates the cost of this system to be $189 million in 
the first year and more than $600 million through 2015. The other solution, called 
APIS 60, is similar to the current system of sending passenger lists in bulk, but would 
cost more money to implement as a standardized process. It would require all 
passenger information to be sent to the government sixty minutes before plane 
departure. This would likely have an effect on check-in times, requiring passengers to 
be checked into their flights early in order to provide the sixty-minute window for 
name processing. Lott estimates $250 million in the first year for this and up to $1.9 
billion over the next ten years. On August 9, 2007, DHS announced that the two 
options had been adopted as a rule and airlines would have to begin procedures to 
comply.34 These figures, as part of Lott’s analysis, help us to understand the potential 
costs associated with compliance, but they also provide a benchmark to estimate 
current costs. Lott notes that APIS 60 is similar to what airlines currently do, but is 
more expensive. Given that the more expensive, standardized version is $250 million – 
for the first year alone – a very conservative estimate for what it has cost the airlines to 
comply with no-fly list passenger screening to date is likely something well above $50 
million. A middle range estimate of $100 million seems more likely, given the six years 
that have elapsed since 9/11 and the need to get systems up and running quickly across 
the industry. An upper range figure of $250 million would assume that the one-year 
cost of setting up this new system, while higher than the current system, is roughly 
equivalent to six years of running a less costly system.  
False Positives 
One of the recognized problems with the no-fly list is that, until very recently, the list 
was exceedingly large and false positives were quite common. In the last few years, 
stories of Senator Ted Kennedy and a host of other non-terrorist individuals being 
flagged by the no-fly list and not allowed to fly have appeared in the local and national 
news.35 The reason for this is largely because the no-fly list does not list individuals; it 
lists names, which can lead to the misidentification of individuals. This is most clearly 
seen in dealing with Arabic names that have a number of English transliterations: in 
many cases, multiple derivatives of a name are put on the list in hopes of matching a 
particular individual.36 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in attempting to 
prevent the high number of false positives and attacks on civil liberties, sued TSA and 
the FBI in April 2003 on behalf of Rebecca Gordon and Jan Adams, two individuals 
who were not allowed to fly because their names appeared on the no-fly list.37 TSA and 
DHS eventually settled for $200,000 in damages and attorney fees. An additional 
outcome of the case, however, was that it brought into court many previously hidden 
documents about the inner-workings of the list. One of these documents noted that, in 
November 2005, TSA indicated that 30,000 people in the previous year alone (from 
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2004 to 2005) had contacted the agency to have their names removed from the list.38 
This suggests that, at least until 2005, roughly 30,000 individuals a year had been 
identified as false positives. As the ACLU complaint points out, the only way that one 
can find out if one is on the no-fly list (other than filing a lawsuit to bring the records 
into court) is to attempt to fly.39 If one is on the list and attempts to fly, he/she is 
stopped at the airport by local law enforcement and airport security. Having identified 
how many false positives there are in a given year, we can begin to make sense of the 
associated costs. 
Estimating the cost of these false positives involves a number of disparate activities: 
the cost of the passenger being detained at the airport and missing his/her flight; the 
cost of airport security/personnel detaining the passenger; if a false positive, the cost 
of arriving at the airport early each time one flies to allow time to be cleared; the cost of 
not flying in order to avoid the hassle; and the cost of attempting to get off of the list 
once one has been identified as a false positive. Before estimating these costs, however, 
a burn rate for passenger time needs to be established. Similar to the burn rate 
conducted above for government resources, a similar rate is needed for passengers 
since their time is valuable as well.  
Unlike the difficulty in assessing governmental resource burn rates, doing so for 
airline passengers is relatively straightforward as the airlines themselves have devoted 
many research resources evaluating the costs of delays. One estimate is that, on 
average, airline passenger time can be valued at approximately $50/hour.40 With this 
rate established, we can estimate cost by examining how long each false positive 
requires of an individual. With respect to the time spent being detained by the local 
authorities, it is difficult to account for the significant variability in experience. Some 
individuals report being held for hours in airport back rooms while others are able to 
leave relatively quickly.41 If we assume, for a very conservative figure, an average of two 
hours dealing with airport security, then we can begin to estimate cost. 30,000 
passengers a year who are identified as false positives and spend on average two hours 
dealing with this hassle, translates to roughly $3 million a year. If we assume, however, 
that there are fewer false positives now that the list has been scrubbed over the last 
year, we can discount the yearly figure to roughly $2 million a year. A middle range 
figure would account for a longer experience in dealing with the false positive because 
a two hour delay with airport security would undoubtedly mean a missed flight and 
presumably increased cost. Assuming a longer period of five hours dealing with this 
problem extrapolates to $7.5 million a year. Finally, a higher range figure of ten hours 
dealing with each false positive – from the passenger’s perspective – is possible, given 
the added expense and hassle of missed flights, being forced to fly the next day, etc. 
Such a figure results in a cost of $15 million a year. 
In addition to costs from the passenger perspective, there are also airport/local law 
enforcement costs in dealing with false positives. When a name is flagged on the no-fly 
list, local airport security is called in order to detain the passenger in question.42 There 
are approximately 450 commercial airports in the United States, plus approximately 
200 international airports with flights bound for the U.S. that would all have local law 
enforcement in place to deal with false positives on an “as-needed” basis. We can 
estimate this cost by assuming a standard airport security salary of $35,000/year on 
the conservative end, plus security officials working on no-fly related issues, including 
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false positives, on a part-time (25%) basis. This equates to approximately $5.5 million 
a year in no-fly list associated costs for the use of airport security personnel. 
Finally, a large cost associated with false positives is passengers attempting to be 
removed from the list. One of the criticisms of DHS has been that if a passenger is 
placed on the no-fly list mistakenly, it can be a very laborious process getting off of the 
list. There are reports of individuals being asked to sign notarized copies of documents 
and letters, producing birth certificates, copies of passports, and – reportedly – even 
voter registration cards.43 There is a cost entailed in producing each of these 
documents, but the largest cost undoubtedly is the time required to gather the 
respective documents. DHS does not publish how many individuals attempt to be 
removed from the list each year, but given the known number of false positives, we can 
base cost estimates on that figure. If, for instance, 10 percent of the 30,000 individuals 
on the false positive list attempt to be removed from the list, and gathering the 
required documents takes approximately ten hours per individual, the cost translates 
to approximately $1.5 million/year. A less conservative estimate of the number of 
individuals attempting to be removed from the list is a quarter of this number, or 
7,500. This translates to a cost of $3.75 million/year. Finally, if we estimate an upper-
range figure of approximately 50% of the false positives pursuing the process of name 
removal, the cost is $7.5 million/year.44 Granted, there is undoubtedly fluctuation in 
these estimates because it is unclear whether or not the 30,000 false positives 
represent distinct individuals or some individuals being flagged more than once in a 
given year. This estimate, however, does provide an approximation of the cost at the 
three probability levels. 
Flight Diversions and Delays 
One of the ramifications of the no-fly list over the last several years has been the 
number of flight diversions and delays due to list operations. A KLM flight from 
Amsterdam to Mexico, on April 10, 2005, is a representative example. The plane was 
en route from Amsterdam to Mexico and was due to cross over U.S. airspace. The U.S. 
government ordered the plane to return to the Netherlands before reaching the United 
States because it said two of its passengers were barred from entering U.S. territory.45 
The plane had been in the air for more than four hours before returning to Europe and 
caused 278 passengers delays of approximately twenty-four hours. The Washington 
Post reported, in July, 2005, that the two men removed from the flight were 
questioned but not arrested. In sum there have been seven total diversions, and 
presumably countless delays, due to no-fly list processing incidents that are not 
reported. The aim of this section is to assess the costs of these delays. 
One of the better estimates of the cost of flight diversions comes from the medical 
community. Medical events constitute the major recurrent reason for flight diversions. 
From heart attacks to seizures, passengers routinely get sick on airplanes and the 
aircraft diverts to a close airport in order to seek medical attention for the sick 
individual. A study of neurological sickness diversions estimates that the cost of each 
diversion is somewhere between $15,000 and $893,000, depending on the route 
(international vs. domestic), the length of the delay, whether or not fuel must be 
dumped to achieve optimal weight before landing, etc.46 For our purposes a reasonable 
range for the cost of diversions is likely $500,000-$893,000, as all seven known 
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diversions have been on international flights. Extrapolating a conservative figure of 
$500,000 per diversion, this results in a total cost of $3.5 million since 2002 
($500,000 x 7 diversions). A medium-range figure of $700,000 per diversion results 
in a cost of $4.9 million. Finally, at an upper limit of $893,000 per diversion, the total 
cost due to the no-fly list is roughly $6.25 million. As discussed above, these figures 
only represent actual diversions, instances where the plane was forced to land 
somewhere other than its intended destination. The figures do not include delays due 
to no-fly list processing, as that data is not published by the airline industry. 
Other Costs 
Finally, there are other costs associated with the no-fly list that will not be examined 
thoroughly here because assessing a financial figure for each of them is difficult. 
Lawsuits against U.S. government agencies, typically DHS, TSA and the FBI, with 
respect to no-fly list related issues (such as harassment) are numerous and presumably 
quite costly for both sides of the case. A recent search in the WestLaw database 
identified fourteen disparate case filings against the U.S. government regarding the no-
fly list. One prominent case, filed by the ACLU, resulted in a settlement of $200,000 
by TSA and DHS for the victims of unnecessary harassment and detainment.47 It is 
unknown how many resources are spent responding to these cases, but the numbers 
are likely significant48 and a potentially fruitful area of further research. 
ANALYSIS OF NO-FLY LIST BENEFITS 
The government’s cost-benefit framework suggests that just as costs can be tangible 
(such as money spent on a particular product) and intangible (such as opportunity 
costs), so too can the benefits of a particular policy. Therefore in analyzing and 
assessing the benefits of the no-fly list, it is important to cover not only the financial 
returns, or tangible benefits to taxpayers, but more intangible benefits as well, such as 
the use of the list as a deterrent to committing terrorist acts with airliners. Arguably 
the intangibles of the no-fly list provide greater benefit, since the aim of the list is 
prevention and not necessarily a monetary return on investment. It is to those 
intangible benefits that we shall turn first. 
Stopping/Deterring Potential Plots 
If the no-fly list is successful in what it aims to do, the largest benefit to the country is 
stopping potential plots that are in the works by not allowing dangerous individuals to 
board airplanes and commit terrorist attacks on/with the aircraft. The argument is 
straightforward: if the current implementation of the no-fly list existed on September 
11, 2001 and the would-be hijackers were on the list, it would have been impossible for 
them to fly. This is the argument that is made by Kip Hawley, TSA Administrator. In an 
interview with Bruce Schneier, Hawley noted that the no-fly list is worthwhile “because 
it works.” Hawley further pointed out that “[TSA does] not publicize how often the no-
fly system stops people you would not want on your flight. Several times a week would 
low-ball it.”49 Two questions immediately arise from these comments: is it true that the 
no-fly system works in preventing would-be terrorists from boarding airplanes, and, 
what is to be made of the claim that “several” potentially dangerous individuals are 
prevented from boarding airplanes a week?  
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The problem with the first claim, that the no-fly system works, is that it is relatively 
easy to bypass the system with a little ingenuity. For instance, the no-fly list’s core 
mechanism is a matching a name to photograph identification.50 As noted above, the 
process is for a passenger’s name to be cross-checked against the list and then verified 
as the name matching the individual by checking photo identification. This process 
assumes a number of key points. First, an assumption is made that the ticket was 
purchased using the passenger’s real name. If a would-be terrorist knows that he or she 
is on the no-fly list, the next logical step would be to purchase the ticket under an 
assumed name that is not on the list. Second, the process also assumes that the photo 
ID is real and represents the true identity of the individual in question. It would be 
relatively easy, for instance, for someone to make a reservation under an assumed 
name and either manufacture an ID or use the real identification of the assumed 
individual. Third, this process is made easier by the increase in “print-at-home” 
boarding passes, which are easy to forge and allow would-be terrorists to put any name 
they like on the boarding pass. These three aspects of the no-fly list make it simple for 
an individual to purchase a ticket under someone else’s name, use a real ID to enter the 
boarding terminal with a forged boarding pass, and then fly on the ticket that has 
someone else’s name.51 Some security experts have gone so far as to create a “fake 
boarding pass generator” on the Internet to illustrate how easy it is to forge a boarding 
pass.52 Importantly, this is not just a theoretical exercise. A CBS affiliate in Kansas 
City, in an undercover investigation, was able to enter the TSA secure area by 
producing a fake ID.53 The undercover individual was not stopped or asked any 
additional questions. Thus, if the no-fly list is stopping individuals who wish to commit 
terrorist attacks, those individuals have not employed all of the strategies that are at 
their disposal; this should raise questions as to whether or not the no-fly list achieves 
the benefits its administrators claim. 
The second claim made of the no-fly list is that it does stop terrorist events, or at 
least dangerous individuals, on a routine basis; we do not hear about them because the 
government keeps that information close to the vest (except when questioned, such as 
in the Schneier interview). Three questions arise from this claim. First, why would the 
government want to keep such information secret? Perhaps more importantly, why 
does the empirical record of other terrorist prevention activities suggest that the 
government’s strategy is very often the opposite? It lets everyone know about potential 
activities before they are well formed. Finally, if what Hawley claims is true, are there 
many more potential terrorists in this country than is commonly believed (since they 
are being stopped several times a week) or is the no-fly list ineffective at stopping 
terrorists? Is it casting a much wider net and catching non-dangerous individuals as 
well?  
With respect to publicizing no-fly list successes, it would seem that as a deterrent 
mechanism the government would want would-be terrorists to know that the no-fly list 
works; that it catches dangerous individuals, and therefore, it is not wise to try to fly if 
you have thoughts of committing a terrorist act. This is particularly true given the 
amount of information available on the Internet about how to bypass the no-fly list, 
such as the forged boarding pass generator. If the government wanted to counteract 
the effect of that type of information being available, it would seem reasonable to show 
the public that despite these apparent flaws, the no-fly list works well in stopping 
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dangerous individuals. A response to this argument is that there is greater benefit 
derived from keeping the successes of the list relatively secret because it keeps 
terrorists continually guessing and unsure about how effective the government is at 
tracking them and preventing their action. This argument might have some merit, but 
the empirical record of the government with respect to publicizing potential terrorist 
threats and foiled plots suggests that they do not subscribe to the secrecy strategy. 
There are numerous examples of the government pursuing a strategy of publicity 
rather than secrecy when it involves letting the country know about terrorist plots and 
threats. Two examples, one from a small-scale potential attack and one from a large-
scale potential attack, should illustrate the point. In June 2005, the U.S. government 
held a press conference in Lodi, California to make public a foiled terrorist plot that 
involved Hamid Hayat and his father Umer, who had allegedly had connections to 
Pakistani terrorist camps.54The FBI chief of Sacramento said in the public statement 
that Al Qaeda was active in the Lodi, California area and it included “individuals who 
have received terrorist training abroad with the specific intent to initiate a terrorist 
attack in the United States.”55 The subsequent investigation and trial did not elucidate 
any specific intent, but rather revealed an individual who may or may not have been 
sympathetic to Islamic jihad. Nevertheless, in this case the government, without any 
direct knowledge of a specific threat or imminent attack, made public the information 
they had, thus belying the argument that secrecy over publicity is the preferred 
strategy of deterrence. 
The second example is drawn from a much larger potential terrorist attack 
originating in the United Kingdom. From August 9 to August 10, 2006, British 
authorities arrested twenty-four suspects alleged to have been plotting an attack 
against the United States using U.S.-bound aircraft and liquid explosives. A day later 
Michael Chertoff, head of DHS, called the plan “sophisticated” and “imminent,” with 
the plan “getting really quite close to the execution phase” and “in the final stages of 
planning before execution.”56 The subsequent investigation of the plot revealed that 
the government had no solid evidence the plan was close to execution. Specific planes 
or a date had not been set, a number of the suspects did not have passports, and, 
perhaps most important, British authorities had been monitoring the group for months 
and were confident that an attack was not imminent.57 Nevertheless, as was the case 
with Hamid and Umer Hayat, the government came forth before all of the facts were 
available and noted that a potentially very serious threat had been thwarted. 
These two examples of the government making public potential threats before they 
are imminent raises the question of why there is a disconnect between the no-fly list 
secrecy strategy, as verbalized by Hawley, and the publicity strategy pursued during 
other cases. It could be that the government makes the secrecy/publicity decision on a 
case-by-case basis and thought there was value in notifying the public of the first two 
threats, but not no-fly list threats. It is conceivable also that the government only 
wants to alert the public to specific threats. That is, someone being stopped at the 
airport because he/she might be dangerous can be conceived of as a threat, but it is a 
diffuse threat. There are no specific plans or intentions that are automatically divined 
by stopping someone from boarding an aircraft; the individual may or may not have 
had intentions of wrongdoing even though they were on the list. Yet the empirical 
reality seems to suggest that the government sees value in making anti-terror successes 
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public. Given the two examples above, one could reasonably come to the conclusion 
that if the no-fly list had stopped a significant threat, we would have heard about it. 
The more confusing aspect of Hawley’s statement is that the no-fly list stops 
“several” individuals the government does not want flying a week. This would suggest 
that there are potentially would-be terrorists attempting to board aircraft on a routine 
basis. Empirically this is difficult to reconcile with the FBI’s own admission that they 
have found zero terrorist cells in the United States since 9/11,58 and Al Qaeda 
operatives seem to be focusing their energies on Iraq.59 Presumably, if these 
individuals who are being stopped are terrorists, the FBI’s statement would no longer 
be correct. If terrorists are prevalent enough to be boarding aircraft multiple times a 
week, then is it still reasonable to assert that zero terrorist cells have been found in the 
U.S.? Another explanation for the high-number of individuals being stopped is that 
they are on the list, but not necessarily terrorists. As noted above, even with the 
“scrubbing” that has occurred, the list is still quite long and it is not entirely clear that 
everyone on the list poses a threat to the US. Thus, while it might be true that the no-
fly lists stops individuals on a routine basis, the extent to which those individuals 
posed a danger to the aircraft they were about to board remains in question. 
Finally, with respect to stopping potential plots, the effectiveness of the no-fly list is 
questionable because of the unknown danger posed by those on the list. As Bruce 
Schneier points out, the no-fly list is “a list of people so dangerous they cannot be 
allowed to fly under any circumstance, yet so innocent we can't arrest them even under 
the Patriot Act.”60 This is a real and important critique. If the individuals on the no-fly 
list are dangerous, and we have information to suggest that they are dangerous, why 
aren’t they arrested and at least brought in for questioning? Again, the empirical 
record suggests that the government’s approach when dealing with potential terrorists 
is to bring them into custody in order to figure out how real the threat is. This is what 
occurred with the Hayats and the would-be U.K. bombers. This remains an important 
question about the benefits of having the no-fly list: how dangerous are the individuals 
on the list? Presumably if they posed an immediate threat to the United States they 
would be arrested and the government would not wait for them to turn themselves in 
by attempting to fly. One response to this question is that a benefit of the no-fly list is 
not just in arresting individuals, but rather tracking their movements.  
Keeping Individuals In/Out  
One argument for the potential benefit of the no-fly list is that it allows the government 
to track and keep individuals inside the United States. If an individual is believed to 
have connections to terrorist training camps in Pakistan, there might be value in 
preventing that individual from going to Pakistan to be trained, aid in training, or 
otherwise conduct dangerous activities. The problem with this argument is that it is 
belied by actual law enforcement experience. Sources in the security community note 
that, in general terms, it is better to have dangerous individuals outside of the United 
States rather than inside. While the government might be able to keep better track of 
individuals within its borders, the individual’s ability to conduct terrorist activities 
against the U.S. is hampered if that person is residing outside its borders.61 From this 
perspective the no-fly list does not provide substantial benefit by keeping individuals 
in the country, since it is preferable to keep terrorists out, not keep them in. The 
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corollary to this argument is that keeping terrorists out of the country is beneficial. A 
no-fly list, operationalized in international airports with flights bound for the U.S., 
might help to keep dangerous individuals from reaching U.S. soil.  
Further, even if those on the no-fly list do not pose an immediate and credible threat 
to the U.S., there might be value in the government’s ability to keep track of potentially 
harmful individuals. For instance, if there are individuals living in Western Europe 
who are believed to harbor resentment against Western society,62 there is value in the 
United States being notified of their movement and intent. If one of these individuals 
arrives at an international airport attempting to board a flight to the United States, the 
threat may not be specific to that particular flight or any particular plot against the 
country of departure, but nevertheless information about the movement of individuals 
on the list is worthwhile. High-level government officials and security experts routinely 
discuss the merits of layered-based security.63 By building and maintaining movement 
information on suspected individuals, the government is able to derive an additional 
knowledge-based layer of security. This would seemingly serve a real benefit in the 
government’s campaign to better know and understand the enemy.  
Tangible Benefit: Preventing a Costly Attack?  
Having identified many of the potential intangible benefits of the no-fly list that are 
difficult to assess financial value to (such as the ability to track suspected individuals 
and deter potential attacks) it is worth considering what tangible benefit the list might 
serve if it is effective. There are a number of reasons to question whether or not the no-
fly list is able to deliver on the intangible benefits, as outlined above, but assuming that 
it can, what tangible savings might the country realize? 
One way to assess the tangible benefits of preventing an attack is to estimate what it 
would cost the country if the no-fly list was not in place and terrorists were able to 
easily board an aircraft and bring it down. While this represents a scenario that is less 
likely to occur since September 11, 2001, as airline security has increased, it is 
nevertheless worth investigating as a middle-range possibility in terms of cost.64 The 
RAND Corporation, in a 2005 paper investigating the cost and benefits of aircraft 
missile defense systems, estimated that the direct costs of an airliner being attacked in 
flight would approach $1 billion.65 The indirect costs, which are more difficult to 
estimate because predicting state response to the attack is difficult (such as whether or 
not air travel would be shut down for a significant period of time as it was after 9/11), 
are estimated at close to $15 billion when all potential long-term effects are accounted 
for.66 This number would, of course, increase substantially if more than one aircraft 
was involved in an attack. While the tangible cost of a potential airliner attack is useful 
in its own right in providing a sense of what type of benefit the no-fly list might 
provide, it can only be evaluated fully by assigning a probability to the attack, 
computing the probable tangible cost of the attack, and comparing that figure to the 
cost of maintaining the list. It is to that final task that the article now turns.  
BRINGING COSTS AND BENEFITS TOGETHER: CONCLUDING 
THOUGHTS 
Assessing whether or not the no-fly list is valuable or “worth” the money being spent is 
a difficult endeavor because ultimately it is a subjective one without a clear and 
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objective answer. By way of conclusion, however, the article will end with a question in 
hopes that it will spur additional research and discussion on the topic. Comparing the 
intangible benefits to costs is difficult because a quantitative approach is not sufficient; 
assigning a financial figure to intangibles is difficult, and any qualitative approach 
would necessarily be muddied by subjective arguments about the relative merits of the 
intangibles. For instance, some might find high value in the government’s ability to 
monitor and track individuals, while others see this as an ancillary, or indeed (if it 
infringes on the civil liberties and rights of those being monitored) negative “benefit.” 
Tangible benefits are seemingly easier to compare to costs because we can attach a 
financial figure to each benefit, but the probability of realizing those benefits is quite 
subjective. To answer any question regarding the worthiness of the no-fly list the first 
question that must be answered is: how likely is it that there will be an attack attempt? 
The answer to this question is inherently subjective depending on one’s own sense of 
security, how one perceives world events, and how closely one pays attention to world 
politics. Recent polls demonstrate this subjectivity by illustrating the diversity of 
opinion as to whether or not Americans are likely to witness another terrorist attack in 
the near future.67 
Nevertheless, with tangible benefits we at least can compare the realized return to 
the costs of implementation across a range of probabilities. A common methodology 
for assessing cost effectiveness is to multiply the costs of an event by the probability 
that event will happen and then compare that to the costs of a system in place to 
prevent the attack from occurring. For instance, if one perceives a 1 percent chance of 
individuals boarding a plane and bringing it down each year, with the costs of such an 
attack reaching $15 billion, per the RAND study cited above, then one theoretically 
could argue that $150 million (0.01 * $15,000,000,000) should be spent, each year, in 
attempting to prevent such an attack. Similarly, if one considers the probability of an 
attack to be 0.1 percent, then one could argue that the no-fly list is “worth” $15 million 
in prevention of such an attack. Given the costs identified in this article, a first-cut 
reasonable estimate of the probability of an attack needed to justify the cost of the no-
fly system is somewhere between ~ 0.3% and 1.1%. It is important to note, however, 
that this analysis is true only if the no-fly list alone could stop the attack. More likely, 
the no-fly list reduces the likelihood of an attack by adding another layer of security to 
air-travel. How much value it provides in reducing the likelihood of attack is a 
subjective measure. 
In the end the cost effectiveness question hinges on probabilities and therefore will 
not be settled here, as it is beyond the scope of this article. It is critical to assess these 
probabilities, however, and it is hoped that the investigation this article has presented, 
of the costs and benefits of the no fly list, will spur additional work in attempting to 
elucidate educated relative probabilities of various no-fly list related scenarios. It is 
only then that the cost-effectiveness, and the financial worth of the list, can be 
thoroughly assessed.  
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Appendix A – Consolidated Table of No-Fly List Costs 
 
Players/Costs Low Estimate Medium Estimate High Estimate 
    
DHS, TSA, NCIC, 
NSA, DARPA, FBI, 
CIFA, Private Firms, 


















$5.5 million/year $5.5 million/year $5.5+ million/year 
Passenger False 
Positive Airport Time 
 
$2 million/year $7.5 million/year $15+ million/year 
Passenger Removal 
From List Costs 
 
$1.5 million/year $3.75 million/year  $7.5+ million/year 
Airline Diversion 




$0.4 million/year $0.66 million/year $1+ million/year 
Lawsuits Against US 
Government 
 
$1 million/year $2 million/year $5+ million/year 
 
Total Yearly Cost 
 
~$51 million ~$89 million ~$161 million 
 
Total Since 9/11/01 
 
~$300 million ~$536 million ~$966 million 
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